viernes, 26 de marzo de 2021
La 77P6, a examen
domingo, 14 de marzo de 2021
India obtendrá 5 regimientos del sistema de defensa aérea S400
Como todos sabemos, el 15 de octubre de 2016, India y Rusia firmaron un acuerdo para el suministro de cinco regimientos S400 por un valor total de 5.430 millones de dólares. La entrega del primer lote estaba programada para 2020, pero la pandemia ha obligado a retrasar la entrega a finales de 2021. Sin embargo, algunas fuentes afirman que India estaría exigiendo a Rusia que acelere al máximo la fabricación y entrega del pedido, ante la posibilidad cada día más probable de que estalle un conflicto militar entre China e India. Vamos a ver en este post qué ha comprado India, y para qué le puede servir.
¿Qué ha comprado India?
5 regimientos del sistema S400
Cada regimiento incluye 2 baterías de misiles
Cada batería de misiles incluye 4 lanzaderas
Esto hace un total de 5x2x4 = 40 lanzaderas de misiles
En cuanto a munición, el pedido incluye 1.000 misiles, que dividido entre 40 lanzaderas hace un promedio de 25 misiles por lanzadera.
700 de ellos pertenecen a la familia 40N6, y permiten alcanzar objetivos en un radio de entre 350 y 400 Km. Estos misiles de largo alcance incorporan un radar activo para realizar un seguimiento preciso del objetivo, y están pensados para destruir aviones de apoyo tipo AWACS, J-STARS y similares.
El resto de misiles ya serían de alcance medio, del tipo 9M96E y/o 9M96E2, pensados para alcanzar objetivos en un radio de 120 Km, que vuelen a alta velocidad.
El radar del S400 tiene un alcance de al menos 600 kilómetros y puede rastrear hasta 70 objetivos al mismo tiempo.
sábado, 30 de enero de 2021
Estados Unidos amenaza a India con sanciones por los S-400
Estados Unidos ha advertido una vez más a la India que podría enfrentar sanciones por la adquisición de cinco sistemas S-400: "Instamos a todos nuestros aliados y socios a renunciar a las transacciones con Rusia que corren el riesgo de desencadenar sanciones bajo CAATSA", citó a Reuters a un portavoz de la embajada de Estados Unidos en Delhi. Asimismo y en su reciente discurso de despedida, el embajador de Estados Unidos en Delhi, Kenneth Juster, también advirtió a la India que Washington podría invocar la CAATSA en su contra por comprar el S-400. Razones no le faltan, ya que existen serias preocupaciones de que el S-400 pueda recopilar las firmas electrónicas de aviones de origen estadounidense que opera el ejército indio. Estos incluyen aviones de transporte C-17 y C-130J-30 y helicópteros de carga pesada AH-64E Apache y CH-47F Chinook, por ahora.
¿Qué es la CAATSA?
Aprobada en julio de 2017, CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) es la respuesta de Washington a la anexión de Crimea por parte de Rusia en 2014 y su presunta interferencia en las elecciones presidenciales de Estados Unidos dos años después, en 2016. Hasta ahora, Estados Unidos ha impuesto la CAATSA a China y Turquía por comprar dos sistemas S-400 cada uno, ya que el fabricante Almaz-Antey está incluido en la lista negra de Washington. Como parte de las sanciones, Estados Unidos eliminó a Turquía del programa F-35 en julio de 2019, declarando en ese momento que la decisión de Ankara de comprar los S-400 es incompatible con participar en el programa F-35. Ahora bien, ¿las advertencias de sanciones de Estados Unidos a la India se derivan sólo de una decisión operativa para proteger el F-35, o son también una manera de penalizar a Moscú por anexionarse Crimea, y a la India por preferir los S-400 al PAC-3 o el THAAD?
¿Qué es el S-400?
Esencialmente, el S-400 es un sistema defensivo antiaéreo que integra un radar panorámico multifunción con un alcance de 600 km, sistemas autónomos de detección y orientación, y lanzadores. Puede disparar cuatro tipos de misiles con alcances de ataque de entre 400 y 40 km para proporcionar una defensa de varias capas contra aeronaves giratorias y de ala fija, vehículos aéreos no tripulados (UAVs) y misiles balísticos a altitudes de hasta 30 km.
¿En qué aventaja al PAC-3?
El S-400 está organizado en torno al sistema 30K6E, provisto de protección contra interferencias. El 30K6E puede localizar simultáneamente hasta 72 objetivos y rastrear otros 160, lo cual aventaja al PAC-3 que sólo puede localizar simultáneamente hasta 36 objetivos y rastrear otros 125. Asimismo, el S-400 puede alcanzar un objetivo a 400 km con su misil 40N6 recientemente probado, mientras que el PAC-3 puede localizar, y destruir, un avión a 180 km y un misil a 100 km con su complemento de misiles. Por si esto no bastase, el tiempo de implementación del S-400 es de cinco minutos, mientras que el del PAC-3 es de 25 minutos. En cuanto al rango de alcance en altitud, el sistema de defensa aérea ruso puede alcanzar objetivos en un rango desde 10 metros hasta 30 kilómetros, mientras que el rango correspondiente para el sistema PAC-3 va desde 50 metros hasta 25 kilómetros.
¿Se ha usado en combate el S-400?
Existe constancia de que el S-400 ha sido desplegado en Siria pero no se ha usado, y se cree que ha sido el responsable de mantener a raya a los aviones estadounidenses e israelíes. También se cree que es capaz de rastrear la baja firma de radar de los F-35 y los cazas avanzados J-20 de China, pero la efectividad real del S-400 a este respecto sigue envuelta en el misterio.
miércoles, 6 de enero de 2021
S-500: ¿An F-35 Killer?
Conceived as a weapon against ballistic missile threats—and apparently with a secondary capability against air targets—the S-500 uses the 77N6-N and 77N6-N1 kinetic kill missiles.
The missiles are capable of hitting their targets at 7 kilometers per second, which the Russians expect would be sufficient to destroy any incoming aerial target including satellites.
It apparently has the capability to engage targets as high as 124 miles—or 200 km or 656,000 feet— at ranges of 324 nautical miles or 600 km. It can engage as many as 10 incoming ballistic missiles simultaneously and has a response of less than 4 seconds.
¿Which types of missiles does use the S-500?
As Vladimir Karnozov at Aviation International News reported years back, the S-500 uses several types of missiles.
When used against air breathing targets, the S-500 can use the 48N6 family of missiles, which weight about two tons and have an effective range of up to 130 nautical miles (240 kilometers).
For longer-range targets, Karnozov reports that the system uses version of the 40N6 with higher performance. It also employs the shorter range and lighter weight 9M96 and 9M100 family missiles, which weigh 530 pounds (240 kg) and upwards.
¿For what purpose is designed the S-500?
The next generation weapon is designed to supplement Russia’s already potent S-400 and replace the A-135 anti-ballistic missile system.
Not only does the weapon have unprecedented capability to hit high altitude targets—including ballistic missiles and satellites—at extremely long ranges, there have been some claims—usually from the media—that the system could target stealth aircrafts.
However, while some analysts believe that might be theoretically possible, there has been nothing to substantiate that claim.
¿When will be deployed the S-500?
The system isn't scheduled to be deployed until next year - but it's already set records, and caused no shortage of consternation among Western defense planners.
¿Can the S-500 engage stealth aircrafts?
There are some reports that the S-500 can engage stealth aircrafts including the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter or any other low observable platform for that matter.
The Russians claim that the system can engage over the horizon and can be plugged into an air defense network—to include satellites: "It is safe to say already now that Russia has created the world's first multi-stage air defense system, that will reliably protect the country from massive missile strikes," Zvezda TV station stated. "The S-500 will analyze information about a possible missile attack obtained by early warning satellites and over-the-horizon radars, such as the Voronezh, as well as select targets, in terms of their importance, cut off false targets at a great distance, accompany all this and finally issue target designations to various systems."
¿Are there reasons to doubt the capabilities of Russian air defence systems?
While not all aspects of the S-500’s capabilities have been known to have been demonstrated by the West, there is little reason to doubt the capabilities of Russian air defense systems.
Indeed, according to U.S. defense sources, Russia has conducted tests of the S-500 system at ranges that were previously thought to be impossible. According to a CNBC report citing U.S. intelligence officials, “the S-500 surface-to-air missile system successfully struck a target 299 miles away, which the U.S. assessed is 50 miles further than any known test.”
domingo, 3 de enero de 2021
¿Does America Have Any Hope Of Defeating Chinese And Russian A2/AD?
On March 7, 2019 defense analysts from the Rand Corporation told a panel, “In our [war]games, when we fight Russia and China, blue [the U.S. and its allies] gets its ass handed to it.” The scenarios were defenses of the Baltics and Taiwan from invasions by Russia and China, respectively. In both cases, Russia and China leveraged long-range cruise and ballistic missiles to sink U.S. ships hundreds of miles away at sea, destroy forward air bases that short-range F-35 stealth fighters depend upon, and interdict airspace against non-stealth aircraft.
Basically, the analysts think the U.S. needs a larger supply surface-strike missiles to threaten enemies at long range; and a much larger capacity to defend against incoming long-range missiles with counter-missiles. On the offense side, promising new long-range strike weapons include the LRASM anti-ship missile, the stealthy JASSM-ER cruise missile and the Army’s multi-faceted Long-Range Precision Fire program. On the defense side, the Army’s maneuver short-range air defense program and the Navy’s SM-3 and SM-6 offer promising force protection capabilities.
However, just a few days earlier the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) released the report ‘Bursting the Bubble?’ arriving at a very different conclusion: “Much has in recent years been made of Russia's new capabilities and the impact they might have on the ability of NATO member states to reinforce or defend the vulnerable Baltic states in case of crisis or war. On closer inspection, however, Russia's capabilities are not quite as daunting, especially if potential countermeasures are factored in. In particular, surface-to-air missile systems currently create much smaller A2/AD bubbles than is often assumed...Experiences from Syria also raise questions about the actual capabilities of such systems in combat…Anti-ship and anti-land systems pose a greater threat but, here too, countermeasures are available.”
The Swedish report points out that:
- Russia’s S-400 surface-to-air missile system (also in service in China) has yet to actually receive its vaunted 250-mile range 40N6 missiles. Furthermore, very long-range interceptions are only viable against large, slow aircraft (think tankers, cargo planes and AWACS radar planes) flying at high altitude. ‘Pushing back’ vital support planes is still useful, but agile war planes may only become vulnerable within a few dozen miles of a SAM site.
- Another intimidating new technology, anti-ship ballistic missiles, has only been tested against naval targets a few times, and never in combat.
- Short-range air defense systems like the Pantsir-S have repeatedly failed to stop U.S. cruise missile barrages and constant Israeli air strikes.
- A2AD systems can’t see as far as they can shoot: A 40N6 missile (when and if it enters service) may threaten aircraft up to 250 miles (463 Km) away, and a DF-21D may be able to sink a carrier a thousand mile (1.852 Km) away. However, neither missile batteries’ organic fire control radars can realistically acquire targets that far over the horizon due to the curvature of the Earth. Both would need to cue targeting data by networking with remote AWACS radar and maritime patrol planes, UAVs, surveillance satellites, and distant land and sea-based radars.
Taking the analysts’ conclusion together, one can arrive at a more nuanced understanding of the challenges posed by anti-access weapons. Undeniably, A2/AD weapons can threaten large areas and will likely shape operations in the regions where they are present. However, they cannot “shut down” access to a region by themselves, and their threat can be mitigated through appropriate planning using existing technologies and tactics.