South Korea: Duty-free shops still reeling from THAAD impact

In mid-March, China banned the sale of group tours to Seoul in retaliation against the installation of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in southeastern South Korea, which Beijing sees as a security threat. The move has dealt a harsh blow to local duty-free shops, as Chinese tourists were their main customers.

Industry leader Lotte Duty Free saw its sales fall 6.6 percent on-year to 2.6 trillion won ($2.3 billion) during the January-June period, with its operating income nose-diving 97 percent to 7.4 billion won. The company posted an operating income of 37.2 billion won in the first quarter, but it plummeted to an operating loss of 29.8 billion won in the second quarter.

¿What means THAAD?

Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), formerly Theater High Altitude Area Defense, is an American anti-ballistic missile defense system designed to shoot down short, medium, and intermediate range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase (descent or reentry) by intercepting with a hit-to-kill approach.

THAAD was developed after the experience of Iraq's Scud missile attacks during the Gulf War in 1991. The THAAD interceptor carries no warhead, but relies on its kinetic energy of impact to destroy the incoming missile. A kinetic energy hit minimizes the risk of exploding conventional warhead ballistic missiles, and the warhead of nuclear tipped ballistic missiles will not detonate on a kinetic energy hit.

¿What means Scud?

Scud is a series of tactical ballistic missiles developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

The term comes from the NATO reporting name "Scud" which was attached to the missile by Western intelligence agencies.

The Russian names for the missile are the R-11 (the first version), and the R-17 (later R-300) Elbrus (later developments).

The name Scud has been widely used to refer to these missiles and the wide variety of derivative variants developed in other countries based on the Soviet design.

Polonia debería prepararse para la guerra

En fechas recientes, el Atlantic Council of the United States ha publicado un documento bajo el ISBN: 978-1-61977-474-2, accesible públicamente (http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Arming_for_Deterrence_web_0719.pdf) donde se indica a los actuales dirigentes polacos el camino a seguir para anticiparse a un posible -y cada día más probable- enfrentamiento militar con Rusia. Les recomiendo que se lo bajen de internet  y lo lean con atención. Desde luego hay ciertos párrafos que resultan ciertamente inquietantes, sobre todo para los polacos. Se los copio a continuación:

Queda clara la amenaza real de un enfrentamiento militar con Rusia:

This report examines the threat posed by a resurgent Russia before considering NATO’s strategy and posture, focusing particularly on its Northeast region: Poland and the Baltic states. It then considers the implications for Poland and recommends how Polish defense should be reformed to take account of the new reality: That NATO now faces a greater

threat of war in its eastern regions than at any time since the end of the Cold War. 

Aborda la posibilidad de que Rusia realice un ataque sorpresa:

Russia’s political-military leadership actively 

uses military exercises for launching operations 

and intimidating its neighbors. These exercises 

represent a convenient way of camouflaging intent 

should Moscow decide to launch a surprise attack. 

Turning one of these exercises into an operation 

against one or several of the Baltic states would 

give very little or no early warning time for NATO.

Que la OTAN sería incapaz de contrarrestar en un primer momento:

As it stands, NATO’s defense posture is not strong enough to deter Russia. In part, this is because the Alliance’s decision-making will always be slower than Russia’s. NATO should compensate for this with a larger forward presence, better automated military movements that do not require prior North Atlantic Council approval, and adequate delegated authority to the military commanders, which so far has not been carried out at the level required.

Polonia debería comprometerse a atacar a Rusia hasta el final:

Poland should make clear policy declarations regarding its behavior in the event of Russian incursions and on targeting within Russia. (...) A statement is needed that Poland will immediately and unilaterally come to the aid of the Baltics (and Romania), should they be attacked in any way, pending a NATO-wide decision on Article 5. It should seek analogous declarations for itself, the Baltics, and Romania from the United States, the United Kingdom, and other allies, and reciprocity from Romania, as well. (...)

Poland should aim to join the 

tactical nuclear capability 

scheme within NATO, so 

enabling its F-16s to be 

carriers of tactical nuclear 

ordnance. (...) 

Poland should declare that it reserves the right to make counterattacks deep into Russian territory if Russia ever attacked Poland, notably with the long-range JASSM air launched cruise missiles it will receive from the United States later this year. (...) Poland should publish a potential list of targets, for example in the Kaliningrad Oblast. Kaliningrad city itself is less than 30 km from Poland, while the Pionerski strategic radar is some 60 km distant. (...) Poland should announce that it reserves the right to deploy offensive cyber operations (and not necessarily in response just to cyber attacks). The authorities could also suggest potential targets, which could include the Moscow metro, the St. Petersburg power network, and Russian state-run media outlets such as RT. (...) Poland should declare that, if attacked, it reserves the right to dispatch Special Operations Forces (SOF) into Russian territory such as Kaliningrad, in order to help destroy high-value targets, e.g. the Pantsyr and other missile batteries, which may be difficult to disable by methods such as jamming. (...) Poland should demonstrate the ability independently to target weapons and to launch these forces and capabilities. It should also show the ability to move forces into the Baltics and possibly Romania, in the process demonstrating joint action with relevant elements of US and other allied units.

Acción política:

Poland should undertake firm opposition to any 

EU plans (such as may be contemplated in the 

new Global Strategy on Foreign and Security 

Policy) envisaging an EU military force.

Medidas estratégicas urgentes:

As for immediate needs, Poland should improve 

the overall command and control of its forces, 

plus undertake a number of urgent acquisitions 

to bolster strategic deterrence and tactical preparations. (...) Poland should undertake these urgent procurements using radically different methods to overcome the systemic delays in the past. (...) Poland should ensure that all battlefield radios are digital and encrypted. Indeed, it should ensure that all Ministry and Armed Forces communications are secure, as many doubts on this matter persist. (...) Poland has been contemplating the Extended Range (900 km) JASSM cruise missile. If it places an order, it will be the first US ally to operate the Extended Range variant. Poland should expedite this procurement, mobilizing the support required in the US Congress. (...) Poland should address its capacity for independent targeting of key weapons, JASSM missiles, and others. (...) Poland should plan and train for the dispersal of the F-16s and weaponry to temporary, random airfields and roads in Poland itself, in the Baltics, and Romania. (...) 

The Naval Strike Missile (NSM) coastal missiles 

launched from two batteries of onshore mobile 

launchers serve primarily to interdict surface 

shipping, but can also have a strategic dimension. 

With a 185 km range, if properly targeted they can 

also destroy onshore targets, say in Kaliningrad.

 Poland should rapidly augment its targeting radars for longer distances. It should also order more of these NSM missiles 

and launcher. Its two batteries cost $132 million in total. Incremental missiles were recently reported to cost somewhat over $2 million each. (...) Poland should contract with NATO-member militaries or civilian firms to develop cyber capabilities and train Polish cyber troops, complementing measures already underway. Poland should develop an information warfare capability using social media and other channels, to counter Russia’s active propaganda campaign, which uses overt methods and its numerous “trolls.” (...) Poland should seek to accelerate licensed production of the 1,000 Spike ATGMs, ordered from PGZ’s Mesko plant for delivery in 2017-20. Some of its 670 Rosomak wheeled Infantry Fighting Vehicles can transport Spike-equipped troops (and 307 more Rosomaks are on order). If needed, Poland should order rival ATGM systems for faster delivery. (...) Poland should immediately order an adequate number of the new Polish Piorun missiles, to supplement the approximately 2,000 Polish Grom missiles currently held (400 launchers, with only 5 missiles per launcher). (...) A network of all-weather shelters should be constructed, with stores of food, fuel, weapons and ammunition, medical kit, and communications gear.

Plan de movilización:

Poland should plan mobilization (including transport to northeastern Poland, the Baltics, and Romania) for both its Regular and Reserve units. Mobilization domestically of the new Territorials should also be on the agenda. (...) Poland should demonstrate readiness by frequent exercises. Interchangeable and mutually redundant channels should be planned. Railways, aircraft from the national carrier LOT and other sources, civilian road vehicles, and Polish and non-Polish ferries should all be included, in addition to the military’s own resources. (...) Transport for the Territorials should include use of local civilian 4WD and other vehicles. Mobilization and transfers east from the center and west of the country should be planned and publicly rehearsed. (...) Radical change is needed to the archaic culture regarding MRO, which calls for most of it to be done by Poland’s military. Civilian contractors should be brought in to replace over-stretched or badly run military servicing units.

Rusia, China, Terrorismo... ¿hacia una nueva guerra fría?

El nuevo año recién comenzado nos deja sobre el tapete cuestiones no resueltas que llevan camino de abocarnos a todos a una suerte de guerra fría global... en el mejor de los escenarios. Vamos a exponerlas brevemente a continuación.

Terrorismo

• El peligro terrorista constituye ciertamente un peligro global que requiere respuestas inmediatas a todos los niveles, incluído el militar.
• El avance de los grupos terroristas en Irak, Afganistán y Siria, así como la amenaza de extender sus acciones hacia Europa y Estados Unidos, van a exigir un considerable aumento de los presupuestos militares, especialmente en el apartado de Inteligencia: El terrorista es un enemigo que no da la cara, y es preciso contar con todos los medios técnicos y humanos que sea posible, al objeto de identificar y neutralizar las amenazas.
• La posibilidad de que grupos terroristas consigan el control de armas de destrucción masiva resulta improbable... hoy por hoy: Tanto Estados Unidos como Rusia protegen celosamente sus bases y lanzaderas de ICBMs, e incluso han aumentado recientemente el nivel de seguridad.

China

• China está desarrollando una impresionante carrera de armamentos a todos los niveles, pero cabe destacar como riesgo mayor su probada capacidad para dotarse de misiles nucleares capaces de golpear objetivos localizados a 11.000 Km de distancia.
• Es cierto que Estados Unidos cuenta con suficientes medios para contrarrestar un ataque de esa envergadura, pero no es menos cierto que China ha desarrollado misiles hipersónicos que se presume pueden dejar fuera de combate la capacidad de respuesta norteamericana.
• China posee medios humanos y técnicos cuyo principal objetivo es anular las infraestructuras del enemigo controladas mediante ordenadores. En ese sentido, cualquier país resulta vulnerable.

Rusia

• Al igual que China, Rusia está desarrollando un ambicioso programa de modernización de su arsenal nuclear, enfocado no tanto a un mayor alcance sino a dotarse de misiles capaces de atravesar el escudo antimisiles de la OTAN.
• Un ataque simultáneo a Estados Unidos por parte de China y Rusia pondría en serios aprietos la capacidad de respuesta norteamericana y arrastraría a la guerra al resto de países de la OTAN.

David del Fresno Consultores

Asesoría en Impresión 3D y Manufactura Aditiva

http://daviddft.wix.com/david-del-fresno

Poland urges NATO

NATO’s 28 members decided in 2010 to create a missile shield based on US technology.

The project is due to be completed in 2020, with significant elements in Romania and Poland. But last monday Poland urged NATO’s new secretary general to push ahead with the missile shield system amid the West’s worst standoff with Russia since the Cold War.

Mr. Jens Stoltenberg, who chose Warsaw for his first foreign visit, said Poland is "a key contributor to our missile defence system.” Stoltenberg, who took over as NATO chief on 1st October, insisted that Russia must reverse course in Ukraine but stressed that the alliance remains open to a constructive relationship with Moscow.

Tension mounted further after Russian President Vladimir Putin was quoted last month as saying that “if I wanted, Russian troops could not only be in Kiev in two days, but in Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn, Warsaw or Bucharest, too.” The escalation of tensions with Russia since January over its role in the Ukraine crisis has sounded the alarm on NATO’s eastern flank in countries that were under Moscow’s thumb during the Soviet era.

The Western defence alliance insists the role of the planned shield is a “purely defensive” response to external threats, notably from so-called “rogue states”, and is in no way directed against Russia. “We firmly support the creation of this system as a pan-NATO one because only this makes deep sense both politically and in terms of defence,” Poland’s President Bronislaw Komorowski said at a joint press conference with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. “Poland is determined to build its missile shield and air defence system — it’s important not only for Poland — and we uphold our obligations for the US portion of this project,” stated.

Russia says dissatisfied

Russian Deputy Defence Minister Anatoly Antonov said Russia had voiced concerns over planned U.S. ground-launched arms tests next year in Romania and in 2018 in Poland, which he said the U.S. side assured him would only use anti-rocket defences and would not fall foul of the treaty.

Relations between the two countries are at their lowest since the Cold War because of Russia's role in the crisis in Ukraine, and both Moscow and Washington question the other's commitment to the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty.

Russia argues that Washington's use of drones and other intermediate-range arms amounts to a violation of the treaty and has said that planned U.S. weapons tests in Romania and Poland may also breach the agreement. Also, Russia said on Thursday it was dissatisfied with talks held with U.S. officials to address concerns that Moscow had violated a Cold War-era arms control agreement by testing a ground-launched cruise missile.

About the treaty, Anatoly Antonov said last month Moscow was committed to the treaty but President Vladimir Putin has questioned whether it meets Russia's interests, bearing on mind the INF treaty eliminated nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500-5.500 km (300-3.400 miles).

US Nuclear Missiles: So aged as ignored

The Minuteman is no ordinary weapon: This missile can hit the enemy across the globe, as quickly as you could have a pizza delivered to your doorstep.

The “Big Sticks,” as some call the 60-foot-tall Minuteman III missiles, are just plain old. But the Air Force asserts with pride that the missile system, more than 40 years old and designed during the Cold War to counter the now-defunct Soviet Union, is safe and secure.

¿Safe and secure? Mmm... The Minuteman has indeed been updated over the years and remains ready for launch on short notice, but the items that support it have grown old. Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James said the Air Force will find $50 million in this year’s budget to make urgent fixes, and will invest an additional $350 million in improvements over the coming five years. Even that, she said, is unlikely to be enough and more funds will be sought.

Since its initial deployment in 1970, the Minuteman III missile itself has been upgraded in all its main components. But much of the rest of the system that keeps the weapon viable and secure has fallen on hard times. One example is the Huey helicopter fleet, which escorts road convoys that move Minuteman missiles, warheads and other key components. It also moves armed security forces into the missile fields in an emergency, even though it’s too slow, too small, too vulnerable to attack and cannot fly sufficient distances. And It’s also old: The seven Hueys flown daily at Minot were built in 1969. The yearly cost of keeping them running has more than doubled over the past four years, according to Air Force statistics – from $12.9 million in 2010 to $27.8 million last year. “Obviously we need a new helicopter, based on the mission,” said Maj. Gen. Jack Weinstein, who as commander of 20th Air Force is responsible for the operation, maintenance and security of the full fleet of Minuteman missiles.

Russia Plans to Release A New Nuclear Missile

Russia is planning on deploying a new type of long range missiles to replace the Cold War missile known as “Satan”. The Voyevoda, which NATO has dubbed the SS-18 Satan, was developed in the 70s and they are reaching the end of their service life. It is said that these missiles were “stuff in nightmares” for the United States during the stand off between the US and the Soviets.

Exploring The Parks: Minuteman Missile National Historic Site

If you are old enough to remember the Cold War with its “duck and cover” drills at school, or sweating it out with the rest of the nation as we watched anxiously to see if President Kennedy could make the Soviets back down during the Cuban missile crises, then you will surely remember the Minuteman nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile.

Minuteman missiles were part of a huge, complex, and very frightening weapons system designed to provide what was referred to as “Mutual Assured Destruction” in the years between the end of World War II, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 1991.

 

 

As tensions escalated between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union, U.S. military devised a plan to keep U.S. safe through deployment of so many nuclear-tipped Minutemen that it would be impossible for an enemy to neutralize all of them. For over 30 years, two Air Force officers (on rotating shifts with other duos) waited underground in all those control centers ready to turn the keys that would bring about the end of the world.

 

 

At Minuteman Missile National Site, you’ll have the chance to ride a small elevator down into one of those control centers. (Read More)