Estados Unidos amenaza a India con sanciones por los S-400

Estados Unidos ha advertido una vez más a la India que podría enfrentar sanciones por la adquisición de cinco sistemas S-400: "Instamos a todos nuestros aliados y socios a renunciar a las transacciones con Rusia que corren el riesgo de desencadenar sanciones bajo CAATSA", citó a Reuters a un portavoz de la embajada de Estados Unidos en Delhi. Asimismo y en su reciente discurso de despedida, el embajador de Estados Unidos en Delhi, Kenneth Juster, también advirtió a la India que Washington podría invocar la CAATSA en su contra por comprar el S-400. Razones no le faltan, ya que existen serias preocupaciones de que el S-400 pueda recopilar las firmas electrónicas de aviones de origen estadounidense que opera el ejército indio. Estos incluyen aviones de transporte C-17 y C-130J-30 y helicópteros de carga pesada AH-64E Apache y CH-47F Chinook, por ahora.

¿Qué es la CAATSA?

Aprobada en julio de 2017, CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) es la respuesta de Washington a la anexión de Crimea por parte de Rusia en 2014 y su presunta interferencia en las elecciones presidenciales de Estados Unidos dos años después, en 2016. Hasta ahora, Estados Unidos ha impuesto la CAATSA a China y Turquía por comprar dos sistemas S-400 cada uno, ya que el fabricante Almaz-Antey está incluido en la lista negra de Washington. Como parte de las sanciones, Estados Unidos eliminó a Turquía del programa F-35 en julio de 2019, declarando en ese momento que la decisión de Ankara de comprar los S-400 es incompatible con participar en el programa F-35. Ahora bien, ¿las advertencias de sanciones de Estados Unidos a la India se derivan sólo de una decisión operativa para proteger el F-35, o son también una manera de penalizar a Moscú por anexionarse Crimea, y a la India por preferir los S-400 al PAC-3 o el THAAD?

¿Qué es el S-400? 

Esencialmente, el S-400 es un sistema defensivo antiaéreo que integra un radar panorámico multifunción con un alcance de 600 km, sistemas autónomos de detección y orientación, y lanzadores. Puede disparar cuatro tipos de misiles con alcances de ataque de entre 400 y 40 km para proporcionar una defensa de varias capas contra aeronaves giratorias y de ala fija, vehículos aéreos no tripulados (UAVs) y misiles balísticos a altitudes de hasta 30 km.

¿En qué aventaja al PAC-3?

El S-400 está organizado en torno al sistema 30K6E, provisto de protección contra interferencias. El 30K6E puede localizar simultáneamente hasta 72 objetivos y rastrear otros 160, lo cual aventaja al PAC-3 que sólo puede localizar simultáneamente hasta 36 objetivos y rastrear otros 125. Asimismo, el S-400 puede alcanzar un objetivo a 400 km con su misil 40N6 recientemente probado, mientras que el PAC-3 puede localizar, y destruir, un avión a 180 km y un misil a 100 km con su complemento de misiles. Por si esto no bastase, el tiempo de implementación del S-400 es de cinco minutos, mientras que el del PAC-3 es de 25 minutos. En cuanto al rango de alcance en altitud, el sistema de defensa aérea ruso puede alcanzar objetivos en un rango desde 10 metros hasta 30 kilómetros, mientras que el rango correspondiente para el sistema PAC-3 va desde 50 metros hasta 25 kilómetros.

¿Se ha usado en combate el S-400?

Existe constancia de que el S-400 ha sido desplegado en Siria pero no se ha usado, y se cree que ha sido el responsable de mantener a raya a los aviones estadounidenses e israelíes. También se cree que es capaz de rastrear la baja firma de radar de los F-35 y los cazas avanzados J-20 de China, pero la efectividad real del S-400 a este respecto sigue envuelta en el misterio.

¿Does America Have Any Hope Of Defeating Chinese And Russian A2/AD?

On March 7, 2019 defense analysts from the Rand Corporation told a panel, “In our [war]games, when we fight Russia and China, blue [the U.S. and its allies] gets its ass handed to it.”  The scenarios were defenses of the Baltics and Taiwan from invasions by Russia and China, respectively. In both cases, Russia and China leveraged long-range cruise and ballistic missiles to sink U.S. ships hundreds of miles away at sea, destroy forward air bases that short-range F-35 stealth fighters depend upon, and interdict airspace against non-stealth aircraft.

Basically, the analysts think the U.S. needs a larger supply surface-strike missiles to threaten enemies at long range; and a much larger capacity to defend against incoming long-range missiles with counter-missiles. On the offense side, promising new long-range strike weapons include the LRASM anti-ship missile, the stealthy JASSM-ER cruise missile and the Army’s multi-faceted Long-Range Precision Fire program. On the defense side, the Army’s maneuver short-range air defense program and the Navy’s SM-3 and SM-6 offer promising force protection capabilities.

However, just a few days earlier the Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) released the report ‘Bursting the Bubble?’ arriving at a very different conclusion: “Much has in recent years been made of Russia's new capabilities and the impact they might have on the ability of NATO member states to reinforce or defend the vulnerable Baltic states in case of crisis or war. On closer inspection, however, Russia's capabilities are not quite as daunting, especially if potential countermeasures are factored in. In particular, surface-to-air missile systems currently create much smaller A2/AD bubbles than is often assumed...Experiences from Syria also raise questions about the actual capabilities of such systems in combat…Anti-ship and anti-land systems pose a greater threat but, here too, countermeasures are available.” 

The Swedish report points out that:

• Russia’s S-400 surface-to-air missile system (also in service in China) has yet to actually receive its vaunted 250-mile range 40N6 missiles. Furthermore, very long-range interceptions are only viable against large, slow aircraft (think tankers, cargo planes and AWACS radar planes) flying at high altitude. ‘Pushing back’ vital support planes is still useful, but agile war planes may only become vulnerable within a few dozen miles of a SAM site.

• Another intimidating new technology, anti-ship ballistic missiles, has only been tested against naval targets a few times, and never in combat.

• Short-range air defense systems like the Pantsir-S have repeatedly failed to stop U.S. cruise missile barrages and constant Israeli air strikes.

• A2AD systems can’t see as far as they can shoot: A 40N6 missile (when and if it enters service) may threaten aircraft up to 250 miles (463 Km) away, and a DF-21D may be able to sink a carrier a thousand mile (1.852 Km) away. However, neither missile batteries’ organic fire control radars can realistically acquire targets that far over the horizon due to the curvature of the Earth. Both would need to cue targeting data by networking with remote AWACS radar and maritime patrol planes, UAVs, surveillance satellites, and distant land and sea-based radars.

Taking the analysts’ conclusion together, one can arrive at a more nuanced understanding of the challenges posed by anti-access weapons. Undeniably, A2/AD weapons can threaten large areas and will likely shape operations in the regions where they are present. However, they cannot “shut down” access to a region by themselves, and their threat can be mitigated through appropriate planning using existing technologies and tactics.

Erdogan garantiza la implementación de los S-400

El presidente turco, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, prometió que se implementará el contrato para los sistemas de misiles S-400 rusos, dijo el viernes la presidenta de la cámara del parlamento superior del Consejo de la Federación de Rusia, Valentina Matviyenko, después de conversaciones con el líder turco en Estambul: "Naturalmente, se dedicó atención al tema de los sistemas S-400. Dijo que se ha ejercido una presión sin precedentes sobre Turquía y que aún continúa, pero aseguró que él, como presidente, garantiza que Turquía implementará el contrato".

¿Cómo va a reaccionar Estados Unidos?

Estados Unidos ha estado buscando siempre romper el acuerdo, y ha advertido repetidamente a Turquía que en caso de que compre los sistemas de misiles rusos, no obtendrá cazas de última generación F-35: Estados Unidos estima que los sistemas rusos no son compatibles con los dispositivos de la OTAN, de la que Turquía es miembro, y considera que existe un riesgo de que los operadores rusos que formen a los militares turcos en el manejo de los S-400 puedan al mismo tiempo hacerse con los secretos tecnológicos del F-35. 

¿Qué es el S-400?

El S-400 Triumph de Rusia (nombre de la OTAN: SA-21 Growler) es un moderno sistema de misiles antiaéreos de largo alcance diseñado para destruir aviones, misiles de crucero y misiles balísticos, pudiendo alcanzar objetivos aerodinámicos a una distancia de hasta 400 kilómetros y objetivos balísticos tácticos que vuelen a una velocidad de 4.8 km/s a una distancia de hasta 60 kilómetros.

Los radares del sistema detectan objetivos aéreos a una distancia de hasta 600 kilómetros. Los misiles tierra-aire 48N6E3 del sistema pueden alcanzar objetivos aerodinámicos a altitudes de 10.000-27.000 metros y amenazas balísticas a altitudes de 2.000-25.000 metros.

Una batería S-400 consta de varios vehículos que albergan un centro de mando, diferentes estaciones de radar móviles y hasta 12 vehículos de lanzamiento, dotados de cuatro misiles cada uno.

Está considerado uno de los sistemas de defensa antiaéreo más modernos del mundo, con un coste inferior al de los Patriot estadounidenses.

¿U.S. to sell Patriot missile systems to Turkey?

The Ankara office director of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, told Arab News he believes the decision from the U.S. State Department to dangle the offer of the Patriot system is aimed to make Turkey drop the purchase of the S-400: If Ankara forges ahead with purchasing the Russian alternative, the Patriot offer would allow the U.S. to dismiss Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet program.

The Patriot and S-400 are competing systems, and Washington has firmly opposed to Turkey’s planned acquisition of Russian-made systems that are designed to target American-made military weapons. In words of Nicholas Danforth, a senior policy analyst at the Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Project, “The real breakthrough would only be if Turkey abandoned its plans to buy the S-400s. For the Patriot sale to move forward, Turkish officials must have to convince Washington they are not going to buy the S-400s.”

Lockheed Martin's Gray Wolf

Lockheed Martin received a $110 million, five-year Phase 1 contract from the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) to develop and demonstrate a new low-cost cruise missile called Gray Wolf.

"Lockheed Martin's concept for the Gray Wolf missile will be an affordable, counter-IAD missile that will operate efficiently in highly contested environments," said Hady Mourad, Advanced Missiles Program director for Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control. "Using the capabilities envisioned for later spirals, our system is being designed to maximize modularity, allowing our customer to incorporate advanced technologies such as more lethal warheads or more fuel-efficient engines, when those systems become available. Our AFRL customer will benefit from decades of Lockheed Martin experience in building high-quality, low-cost systems like GMLRS, while capitalizing on the experience of our team in developing and integrating advanced cruise missiles such as JASSM and LRASM on military aircraft," Mourad said.

The Gray Wolf program consists of four spiral-development phases that allow for rapid technology prototyping and multiple transition opportunities. This first phase, defined by an Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract, is anticipated to run until late 2019. Initial demonstrations will be from an F-16 aircraft. In addition to the F-16, the system will be designed for compatibility with B-1, B-2, B-52, F-15, F-18 and F-35 aircrafts. This program seeks to develop low-cost, subsonic cruise missiles that use open architectures and modular design to allow for rapid prototyping and spiral growth capabilities. The AFRL is developing the missiles to feature networked, collaborative behaviors (swarming) to address Integrated Air Defense (IAD) system threats around the world.

Downing down NK missiles: The need of a new approach

Concerned that the missile defense system designed to protect American cities is insufficient by itself to deter a North Korean attack, the Trump administration is expanding its strategy to also try to stop Pyongyang’s missiles before they get far from Korean airspace.

Congressional documents are actually talking about “additional investments” in “boost-phase missile defense.” The goal is to hit long-range missiles at their point of greatest vulnerability: while their engines are firing and the vehicles are stressed to the breaking point, and before their warheads are deployed.

In interviews, defense officials, along with top scientists and senior members of Congress, describe the effort as a response to the unexpected progress that North Korea has made in developing ICBMs capable of delivering a nuclear bomb to the continental United States: “It is an all-out effort,” said Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island, the top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, who returned from a lengthy visit to South Korea last month, convinced that the United States needed to do far more to counter North Korea. “There is a fast-emerging threat, a diminishing window, and a recognition that we can’t be reliant on one solution.”

One first approach is to have stealth fighters such as the F-22 or the F-35 scramble from nearby bases in South Korea and Japan at the first sign of North Korean launch preparations. The jets would carry conventional air-to-air missiles, which are 12 feet long, and fire them at the North Korean long-range missiles after they are launched. But they would have to fly relatively close to North Korea to do that, increasing the chances of being shot down.

A second approach -hinted at in an emergency request to Congress last week for $4 billion to deal with North Korea- envisions the stepped-up use of cyber weapons to interfere with the North’s control systems before missiles are launched. Using cyber weapons to disrupt launches is a radical innovation in missile defense in the past three decades, but in the case of North Korea it is also the most difficult: It requires getting into the missile manufacturing, launch control and guidance systems of a country that makes very limited use of the internet and has few connections to the outside world — most of them through China, and to a lesser degree Russia.

And a third approach is to develop a UAV that would fire potent laser beams at rising missiles. But recent plans would have it make its debut no sooner than 2025 — too late to play a role in the current crisis or the Trump presidency.

23th May: DEFCON 4

There are currently no imminent nuclear threats against the United States. However, there are events that are currently occurring that require closer monitoring. Let's see them below:

1) The United States and North Korea continue to face each other and the tension is increasing: On the part of the United States there are large numbers of men and material displaced towards the Korean peninsula.

On the part of North Korea that country continues advancing in its nuclear program.

2) The situation in the area is very volatile and tension can be aggravated at any time: the United States has deployed 100 F-16 fighter planes on South Korean soil with which it has been carrying out exercises in South Korean airspace on a regular basis during some time. Considering that such exercises often take place prior to an attack -as in the case of Operation Desert Storm- I can suppose a pre-emptive strike at any date against major strategic targets in North Korea, which could be carried out initially using F-35 and Tomahawk missiles. How would North Korea react? At best -that is, in the event that the US pre-emptive strike with the F-35s and Tomahawks knocks out North Korea's anti-aircraft defenses, the artillery pieces aimed at Korea South, and all its nuclear missile launchers- we could hope a quick and definitive solution to the South Korean problem. However, if the first attack does not achieve its objectives, South Korea's reaction may include attacks with weapons of mass destruction directed against any US allied territory that may be within its reach, especially South Korea and Japan. If it could also reach the bases of the United States in other areas of the Pacific and even attack the American continent, the situation would become unpredictable.

3) Another possibility that does not deserve to be dismissed in any way is that North Korea launches a first preventive attack against the United States, generating an electromagnetic pulse on its territory. That pulse would be generated by the detonation of a nuclear device housed in one or both of the two earth observation satellites KMS 3-2 and KMS-4 put into orbit by North Korea in April 2012 and February 2016 respectively. In that case, the negative consequences would be of all kinds: massive blackouts, total communications outages, destruction of electronic systems for airplanes, automobiles, trucks and trains, and all the ensuing chaos: Crashed planes, collapsed roads , Emergency services inoperative, etc.

23 de Mayo: DEFCON 4

Actualmente no hay amenazas nucleares inminentes contra los Estados Unidos. Sin embargo, hay eventos que están ocurriendo actualmente que requieren una vigilancia más estrecha. Vamos a verlos a continuación:

• Los Estados Unidos y Corea del Norte siguen frente a frente y la tensión va en aumento.
• Por parte de Estados Unidos hay un gran número de hombres y material desplazados hacia la Península de Corea.
• Por parte de Corea del Norte ese país continúa avanzando en su programa nuclear.
• La situación en la zona es muy volátil y la tensión puede agravarse en cualquier momento: Estados Unidos tiene desplegados en suelo surcoreano 100 aviones de combate F-16 con los que ha estado realizando ejercicios en el espacio aéreo de Corea del Sur de manera regular durante algún tiempo. Considerando que este tipo de ejercicios a menudo tienen lugar antes de un ataque -tal como fué en el caso de la Operación Tormenta del Desierto- cabe admitir la posibilidad -cada vez más probable- de un ataque preventivo en cualquier fecha -aunque más probablemente a partir del 27 de mayo- contra importantes objetivos estratégicos en Corea del Norte, que se podrían llevar a cabo en un primer momento utilizando aviones F-35 y misiles Tomahawk. ¿De qué manera reaccionaría Corea del Norte? En el mejor de los casos -esto es, en el caso de que el ataque preventivo de Estados Unidos con los F-35 y los Tomahawk deje fuera de combate las defensas antiaéreas de Corea del Norte, las piezas de artillería que apuntan hacia Corea del Sur, y todas sus lanzaderas de misiles nucleares- podríamos pensar en una rápida y definitiva solución al problema de Corea del Sur. Ahora bien, si el primer ataque no consigue sus objetivos, la reacción de Corea del Sur cabe pensar que incluya ataques con armas de destrucción masiva dirigidas contra cualquier territorio aliado de Estados Unidos que pueda quedar a su alcance, especialmente Corea del Sur y Japón. Si además pudiese alcanzar las bases de Estados Unidos en otras zonas del Pacífico e incluso atacar el continente americano, la situación se tornaría impredecible.
• Otra posibilidad que no merece ser descartada en modo alguno es que Corea del Norte lance un primer ataque preventivo contra Estados Unidos, generando un pulso electromagnético sobre su territorio. Ese pulso vendría generado por la explosión de un dispositivo nuclear alojado en uno o ambos de los dos satélites de observación terrestre KMS 3-2 y KMS-4 puestos en órbita por Corea del Norte en Abril de 2012 y Febrero de 2016 respectivamente. En ese caso, las consecuencias negativas serían de todo tipo: Apagones masivos, corte total de comunicaciones, destrucción de los sistemas electrónicos de aviones, automóviles, camiones y trenes, y todo el caos consiguiente: Aviones que caen en tierra, autopistas y carreteras colapsadas, servicios de emergencia inoperativos, hospitales inutilizados, etc.

Mitsubishi gets greenlight

The Japanese government on Thursday gave the green light to export a Japanese-made missile component to the United States, marking the first such decision since the country eased restrictions on arms exports this April, local media reported.

Japan's National Security Council (NSC), a body set up under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to speed up decision-making on defense and diplomacy, also decided the same day to conduct joint research with Britain on air-to-air missiles, said Japan's Kyodo News Agency. Thursday's approval will allow Japan's Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. to export a high-performance sensor to a U.S. defense company, which will use it in the Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) missile defense system to be exported to Qatar.

The sensor is a key component of an infrared device at the tip of the missile that identifies and tracks targets, the Nikkei business daily reported in an earlier report. Regarding the joint missile research with Britain, Japan eyes an agreement on the occasion of a "two-plus-two" meeting of their respective foreign and defense ministers that may be held in Britain as early as September. The missile in question is the Meteor air-to-air missile currently under development between Britain and several European countries, including France and Germany. It could be loaded on F- 35 stealth fighter jets that Japan's Self-Defense Forces are planning to introduce, said Kyodo News.

S-300 in Syria: Efectiveness doubtful

The potential delivery of Russian S-300s to Syria might complicate the majority of military options being considered by the U.S. and Israel for the Syrian conflict. However, for several reasons are there serial doubts whether the S-300 would be fully efficient in real combat conditions. Let us see why.

Serial reasons for serial doubts

• Military experts in the U.S. and Israel are familiar with the S-300 because their air forces have trained to suppress air defences armed with this system in Bulgaria, Slovakia and Greece.
• In the last decade, Israel was designing and arming itself with the ITALD system (Improved Tactical Air Launched Decoy), which is able to decoy radar as well as the S-300 command-and-control systems.
• Even armed with S-300s, Syria would not likely stop more advanced “stealth” aircraft, such as the U.S. Air Force’s F-22, F-35 and B-2, which are not visible on the system’s radar.
• The recent raids by the Israeli Air Force against selected targets in Syria suggest that it would be easy to destroy any S-300 batteries employed there.
• It is also clear that in case Russia is determined to deliver the S-300s, additional Russian advisors and experts would be needed.
• All these factors taken into account might work against Russia making a final decision to deliver the S-300s.

Conclussions

• Under the point of view of many analysts, the S-300 issue seems to be more of an element of disinformation used by Russia to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the West to deter military intervention in Syria.
• There are no doubts that if Russia delivers the S-300s to Syria in the face of U.S., NATO and Israel military engagement, there would be a real combat test of this system.