Aumenta la tensión militar en el Artico

Por primera vez desde el final de la Guerra Fría, la Armada de los Estados Unidos está realizando viajes regulares al Círculo Polar Ártico, más concretamente con una patrulla de cuatro barcos navegando por el Mar de Barents. Tres de los cuatro barcos, que navegan junto a una fragata de la Royal Navy, son destructores antisubmarinos con base en Rota, España.

¿Por qué el Mar de Barents?

La elección del Mar de Barents estriba en su importancia operativa para la flota de submarinos rusa, y con este movimiento Estados Unidos quiere dejar claro a Rusia que el Mar de Barents no le pertenece. Por su parte, Rusia no se ha dejado intimidar por la presencia militar norteamericana en la zona, y ha respondido con el anuncio de que llevará a cabo de forma inminente ejercicios con  fuego real, para dejar clara su opinión al respecto: Rusia tiene intereses económicos estratégicos en el Artico y está comprometida a defenderlos a sangre y fuego, llegado el caso.

¿Qué representa el Artico para Rusia?

Rusia, con 7.000 millas (13.000 km) de costa ártica, ve a la región como un punto clave para su propia seguridad y estabilidad a largo plazo, ya que alberga en su lecho nada menos que el 25 por ciento de las reservas mundiales de petróleo y gas natural, además de estaño, manganeso, niquel, oro, platino y plomo en cantidades importantes. Por ello y sumado a la importancia geoestratégica, el 2 de agosto de 2007 dos batiscafos rusos "Mir" realizaron una inmersión e instalaron en el fondo una bandera rusa, así como una cápsula con un mensaje para generaciones venideras. Los Mir recogieron pruebas para demostrar que las cordilleras subacuáticas Lomonósov y Mendeléiev son la extensión natural de la plataforma continental de Rusia, hipótesis que, de ser confirmada, permitiría a Rusia reivindicar en el futuro derechos exclusivos sobre la explotación de los recursos minerales en esta zona.

¿Qué representa la presencia rusa en el Artico para los Estados Unidos? 

En una audiencia el pasado mes de febrero ante el Subcomité de Seguridad Marítima y Transporte, el subsecretario adjunto del Departamento de Estado para asuntos europeos y euroasiáticos, Michael Murphy, alertó de que la acumulación militar de Rusia en el Ártico amenaza el flanco norte de los Estados Unidos y la OTAN; y Aunque Rusia ha cooperado en la respuesta a derrames de petróleo y en misiones de búsqueda y rescate, Estados Unidos ve con recelo sus movimientos en la zona, más concretamente el establecimiento de una base ártica y la instalación de baterías de misiles costeros, radares de alerta temprana y defensas aéreas. Para Estados Unidos la presencia militar de Rusia en el Artico tiene implicaciones más allá de sus aguas, ya que el Ártico proporciona a los barcos y submarinos rusos el acceso a un punto crítico de estrangulamiento naval: la brecha GIUK.

¿Qué peligro representa para Estados Unidos el acceso ruso a la brecha GIUK?

El término GIUK es el acrónimo en inglés de Groenlandia, Islandia y Reino Unido. Hace referencia a un amplio sector septentrional del Océano Atlántico, de gran importancia estratégica en las dos guerras mundiales y especialmente durante la Guerra Fría, por ser una zona de contacto entre las fuerzas aeronavales y submarinas de la OTAN y de la URSS. Su importancia estratégica se ha visto reforzada más aun si cabe en los últimos años, ya que los cables transatlánticos submarinos pasan tambien por este área.

Polonia debería prepararse para la guerra

En fechas recientes, el Atlantic Council of the United States ha publicado un documento bajo el ISBN: 978-1-61977-474-2, accesible públicamente (http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Arming_for_Deterrence_web_0719.pdf) donde se indica a los actuales dirigentes polacos el camino a seguir para anticiparse a un posible -y cada día más probable- enfrentamiento militar con Rusia. Les recomiendo que se lo bajen de internet  y lo lean con atención. Desde luego hay ciertos párrafos que resultan ciertamente inquietantes, sobre todo para los polacos. Se los copio a continuación:

Queda clara la amenaza real de un enfrentamiento militar con Rusia:

This report examines the threat posed by a resurgent Russia before considering NATO’s strategy and posture, focusing particularly on its Northeast region: Poland and the Baltic states. It then considers the implications for Poland and recommends how Polish defense should be reformed to take account of the new reality: That NATO now faces a greater

threat of war in its eastern regions than at any time since the end of the Cold War. 

Aborda la posibilidad de que Rusia realice un ataque sorpresa:

Russia’s political-military leadership actively 

uses military exercises for launching operations 

and intimidating its neighbors. These exercises 

represent a convenient way of camouflaging intent 

should Moscow decide to launch a surprise attack. 

Turning one of these exercises into an operation 

against one or several of the Baltic states would 

give very little or no early warning time for NATO.

Que la OTAN sería incapaz de contrarrestar en un primer momento:

As it stands, NATO’s defense posture is not strong enough to deter Russia. In part, this is because the Alliance’s decision-making will always be slower than Russia’s. NATO should compensate for this with a larger forward presence, better automated military movements that do not require prior North Atlantic Council approval, and adequate delegated authority to the military commanders, which so far has not been carried out at the level required.

Polonia debería comprometerse a atacar a Rusia hasta el final:

Poland should make clear policy declarations regarding its behavior in the event of Russian incursions and on targeting within Russia. (...) A statement is needed that Poland will immediately and unilaterally come to the aid of the Baltics (and Romania), should they be attacked in any way, pending a NATO-wide decision on Article 5. It should seek analogous declarations for itself, the Baltics, and Romania from the United States, the United Kingdom, and other allies, and reciprocity from Romania, as well. (...)

Poland should aim to join the 

tactical nuclear capability 

scheme within NATO, so 

enabling its F-16s to be 

carriers of tactical nuclear 

ordnance. (...) 

Poland should declare that it reserves the right to make counterattacks deep into Russian territory if Russia ever attacked Poland, notably with the long-range JASSM air launched cruise missiles it will receive from the United States later this year. (...) Poland should publish a potential list of targets, for example in the Kaliningrad Oblast. Kaliningrad city itself is less than 30 km from Poland, while the Pionerski strategic radar is some 60 km distant. (...) Poland should announce that it reserves the right to deploy offensive cyber operations (and not necessarily in response just to cyber attacks). The authorities could also suggest potential targets, which could include the Moscow metro, the St. Petersburg power network, and Russian state-run media outlets such as RT. (...) Poland should declare that, if attacked, it reserves the right to dispatch Special Operations Forces (SOF) into Russian territory such as Kaliningrad, in order to help destroy high-value targets, e.g. the Pantsyr and other missile batteries, which may be difficult to disable by methods such as jamming. (...) Poland should demonstrate the ability independently to target weapons and to launch these forces and capabilities. It should also show the ability to move forces into the Baltics and possibly Romania, in the process demonstrating joint action with relevant elements of US and other allied units.

Acción política:

Poland should undertake firm opposition to any 

EU plans (such as may be contemplated in the 

new Global Strategy on Foreign and Security 

Policy) envisaging an EU military force.

Medidas estratégicas urgentes:

As for immediate needs, Poland should improve 

the overall command and control of its forces, 

plus undertake a number of urgent acquisitions 

to bolster strategic deterrence and tactical preparations. (...) Poland should undertake these urgent procurements using radically different methods to overcome the systemic delays in the past. (...) Poland should ensure that all battlefield radios are digital and encrypted. Indeed, it should ensure that all Ministry and Armed Forces communications are secure, as many doubts on this matter persist. (...) Poland has been contemplating the Extended Range (900 km) JASSM cruise missile. If it places an order, it will be the first US ally to operate the Extended Range variant. Poland should expedite this procurement, mobilizing the support required in the US Congress. (...) Poland should address its capacity for independent targeting of key weapons, JASSM missiles, and others. (...) Poland should plan and train for the dispersal of the F-16s and weaponry to temporary, random airfields and roads in Poland itself, in the Baltics, and Romania. (...) 

The Naval Strike Missile (NSM) coastal missiles 

launched from two batteries of onshore mobile 

launchers serve primarily to interdict surface 

shipping, but can also have a strategic dimension. 

With a 185 km range, if properly targeted they can 

also destroy onshore targets, say in Kaliningrad.

 Poland should rapidly augment its targeting radars for longer distances. It should also order more of these NSM missiles 

and launcher. Its two batteries cost $132 million in total. Incremental missiles were recently reported to cost somewhat over $2 million each. (...) Poland should contract with NATO-member militaries or civilian firms to develop cyber capabilities and train Polish cyber troops, complementing measures already underway. Poland should develop an information warfare capability using social media and other channels, to counter Russia’s active propaganda campaign, which uses overt methods and its numerous “trolls.” (...) Poland should seek to accelerate licensed production of the 1,000 Spike ATGMs, ordered from PGZ’s Mesko plant for delivery in 2017-20. Some of its 670 Rosomak wheeled Infantry Fighting Vehicles can transport Spike-equipped troops (and 307 more Rosomaks are on order). If needed, Poland should order rival ATGM systems for faster delivery. (...) Poland should immediately order an adequate number of the new Polish Piorun missiles, to supplement the approximately 2,000 Polish Grom missiles currently held (400 launchers, with only 5 missiles per launcher). (...) A network of all-weather shelters should be constructed, with stores of food, fuel, weapons and ammunition, medical kit, and communications gear.

Plan de movilización:

Poland should plan mobilization (including transport to northeastern Poland, the Baltics, and Romania) for both its Regular and Reserve units. Mobilization domestically of the new Territorials should also be on the agenda. (...) Poland should demonstrate readiness by frequent exercises. Interchangeable and mutually redundant channels should be planned. Railways, aircraft from the national carrier LOT and other sources, civilian road vehicles, and Polish and non-Polish ferries should all be included, in addition to the military’s own resources. (...) Transport for the Territorials should include use of local civilian 4WD and other vehicles. Mobilization and transfers east from the center and west of the country should be planned and publicly rehearsed. (...) Radical change is needed to the archaic culture regarding MRO, which calls for most of it to be done by Poland’s military. Civilian contractors should be brought in to replace over-stretched or badly run military servicing units.

APKWS-II Gets US Deal

UK defence giant BAE Systems has been chosen to further develop its 'anti-insurgent' missile system for the US military.

The Naval Air Systems Command said it intends to enter into sole source negotiations with the US subsidiary of the British firm to develop the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II).

The project expands integration into the arsenal used on aircraft, including the A-10 'Warthog'. The existing semi-active laser-guided APKWS system is designed as a cheaper alternative to the Hellfire missile, at around a third of the cost - $30,000 (£17,000).

The Hellfire has become renowned for use on Predator and Reaper drones and was originally designed to target armoured vehicles. The APKWS is designed to destroy lightly armoured and "soft" vehicles, moving or stationary, in urban locations. It can be armed with high explosives or flechettes - steel darts - in the warhead.

Earlier this year trials were carried out firing the missile from the A-10 and the new missiles hit within inches of their target. It is based on a 2.75 in (70 mm) rocket with guidance 'canard' lead fins, and the new version has improved laser control for accurate targeting. The original development plan for the precision weapon began in 2002 and the first version has been in full production for three years and used in war zones such as Afghanistan.

It has been fired from more than a dozen aircraft types and been sold to US allies including Jordan, for use on its airborne gunships. BAE Systems programme manager Joe Tiano told Sky News: "Our APKWS laser-guided rocket has a long history of success in theatre and in testing on multiple platforms including the A-10, and we look forward to exploring additional opportunities for integration on the A-10."

UK To Purchase 200 StarStreak

Britain’s Defense Ministry has signed a deal with Thales UK to purchase a new batch of StarStreak short-range surface-to-air missiles, the Northern Ireland-based company has announced.

The contract for 200 missiles will boost weapon stockpiles available to the regular and reserve units that already use the Mach 3 velocity missile, which can travel at more than 1 kilometer per second.

India: Second test-firing of Agni-V

Working at a fast pace towards production and induction of Agni-V missile into the forces, Defence Research and DevelopmentOrganisation (DRDO) is reportedly planning its second test fire next month.

The maiden test fire of Agni-V, the first intercontinental ballistic missile of India, was carried out in April 2012. The successful trial catapulted the country into the exclusive ICBM club comprising six elite countries, United States of America, Russia, China, France and United Kingdom.

Dr. V. G. Sekaran, chief controller R&D Missiles & Strategic Systems and Agni programme director, said that while no date has been fixed for the test as of now, it will be conducted in September. "This test shall be aimed at repeatability of the previous test for stabilizing the performance of sub-systems," he said, adding that DRDO is working at starting the production and delivery phase by 2015 for Agni-V.

Meanwhile, DRDO is leaving no stone unturned for kick starting the canisterization process for Agni-V by this year end. Canister launch of the missile will enable higher flexibility in launching speedy firing from any location on a road. The indigenously developed 50-tonne long range surface-to-surface ballistic missile Agni-V, which is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead weighing more than a tonne, has a 5,000 km range as per DRDO officials, who confirmed that preparations are at full swing at Wheeler Island off the Odisha Coast for a September launch.

Once inducted, India's range with respect to missile reach would include the entire Asia as well as parts of other continents. Agni V will be inducted into the force equipped with MIRVs (Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRVs) for shooting multiple warheads at the same time.

Syria: U.S. U.K. and France entering the stage

UK, US and France military planners are drawing up potential targets for missile strikes on Syria amid growing certainty that the Assad regime was behind chemical weapons attacks which killed hundreds of civilians last week.

While there has been no decision on the type of action, military staff in London and Washington are compiling a list of targets among a range of "and/or" options:

• Arming the rebels
• Creating a safe haven
• Establishment of a no-fly zone
• Surgical cruise missile strikes against chemical weapons facilities (Sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles are the most likely option)

Below are details of U.S., French and British forces in the region that could be involved in case of any attack.

United States

 
• The U.S. Navy has increased its number of cruise missile-carrying destroyers in the Mediterranean to four from three by delaying the return to the United States of the Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Mahan.

 
• The aircraft carrier USS Harry S Truman, by far the most powerful warship in the region, left the Mediterranean last weekend, passing through the Suez Canal into the Red Sea.

 
• As well as the strike aircraft carried by the Truman, several of her escort ships are also capable of firing Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles.

 
• The United States has also had F-16 jets in Jordan, where they remained after a major military exercise this year at the request of the Jordanian government.

 
• Also has a major air base at Incirlik in Turkey that could easily house multiple aircraft as part of a wider military campaign.

United Kingdom

 
• Britain would likely be dependent on its cruise missile-carrying Trafalgar and Astute class attack submarines if it wished to join in any U.S.-led campaign. 

 
• Britain does not currently have any combat aircraft in the region, although they could theoretically operate from UK sovereign bases in Cyprus providing the local government agreed.

France

 

• The French nuclear aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle is operational and remains for now in the Mediterranean port of Toulon.

 

• Also has Rafale and Mirage jets based in the United Arab Emirates that could potentially reach Syria.

Missiles Innovation and Technology Partnership (MCM ITP) Conference

 

The MCM ITP (Materials and Components for Missiles, Innovation and Technology Partnership) is a UK MoD and DGA sponsored research fund open to all Anglo-French companies and Academic Institutions. With a budget of up to 14M€ per year, the MCM ITP programme funds proposals from Industry, SMEs and Academia on an annual cycle with the aim of developing novel, exploitable technologies for generation-after-next missile systems. Launched in 2007, the MCM ITP develops novel, exploitable technologies for generation-after-next missile systems through more than 90 cutting edge research projects. More than 85 Participants from across the UK and France are involved. With up to 14M€ annually available for research projects, the MCM ITP aims to consolidate the Anglo-French Guided Weapons capability. It aims to strengthen the technological base and allow better understanding of common future needs.

 

Date/Time Date(s) - 05/22/2013 - 05/23/2013
All Day

 

Location
Lille Grand Palais Conference Centre (1 boulevard des Cités Unies - Lille)

 

To register, go to http://www.mcmitp.com/register/shop/conference-delegate-registration/