En fechas recientes, el Atlantic Council of the United States ha publicado un documento bajo el ISBN: 978-1-61977-474-2, accesible públicamente (http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Arming_for_Deterrence_web_0719.pdf) donde se indica a los actuales dirigentes polacos el camino a seguir para anticiparse a un posible -y cada día más probable- enfrentamiento militar con Rusia. Les recomiendo que se lo bajen de internet y lo lean con atención. Desde luego hay ciertos párrafos que resultan ciertamente inquietantes, sobre todo para los polacos. Se los copio a continuación:
Queda clara la amenaza real de un enfrentamiento militar con Rusia:
This report examines the threat posed by a resurgent Russia before considering NATO’s strategy and posture, focusing particularly on its Northeast region: Poland and the Baltic states. It then considers the implications for Poland and recommends how Polish defense should be reformed to take account of the new reality: That NATO now faces a greater
threat of war in its eastern regions than at any time since the end of the Cold War.
Aborda la posibilidad de que Rusia realice un ataque sorpresa:
Russia’s political-military leadership actively
uses military exercises for launching operations
and intimidating its neighbors. These exercises
represent a convenient way of camouflaging intent
should Moscow decide to launch a surprise attack.
Turning one of these exercises into an operation
against one or several of the Baltic states would
give very little or no early warning time for NATO.
Que la OTAN sería incapaz de contrarrestar en un primer momento:
As it stands, NATO’s defense posture is not strong enough to deter Russia. In part, this is because the Alliance’s decision-making will always be slower than Russia’s. NATO should compensate for this with a larger forward presence, better automated military movements that do not require prior North Atlantic Council approval, and adequate delegated authority to the military commanders, which so far has not been carried out at the level required.
Polonia debería comprometerse a atacar a Rusia hasta el final:
Poland should make clear policy declarations regarding its behavior in the event of Russian incursions and on targeting within Russia. (...) A statement is needed that Poland will immediately and unilaterally come to the aid of the Baltics (and Romania), should they be attacked in any way, pending a NATO-wide decision on Article 5. It should seek analogous declarations for itself, the Baltics, and Romania from the United States, the United Kingdom, and other allies, and reciprocity from Romania, as well. (...)
Poland should aim to join the
tactical nuclear capability
scheme within NATO, so
enabling its F-16s to be
carriers of tactical nuclear
ordnance. (...)Poland should declare that it reserves the right to make counterattacks deep into Russian territory if Russia ever attacked Poland, notably with the long-range JASSM air launched cruise missiles it will receive from the United States later this year. (...) Poland should publish a potential list of targets, for example in the Kaliningrad Oblast. Kaliningrad city itself is less than 30 km from Poland, while the Pionerski strategic radar is some 60 km distant. (...) Poland should announce that it reserves the right to deploy offensive cyber operations (and not necessarily in response just to cyber attacks). The authorities could also suggest potential targets, which could include the Moscow metro, the St. Petersburg power network, and Russian state-run media outlets such as RT. (...) Poland should declare that, if attacked, it reserves the right to dispatch Special Operations Forces (SOF) into Russian territory such as Kaliningrad, in order to help destroy high-value targets, e.g. the Pantsyr and other missile batteries, which may be difficult to disable by methods such as jamming. (...) Poland should demonstrate the ability independently to target weapons and to launch these forces and capabilities. It should also show the ability to move forces into the Baltics and possibly Romania, in the process demonstrating joint action with relevant elements of US and other allied units.
Poland should undertake firm opposition to any
EU plans (such as may be contemplated in the
new Global Strategy on Foreign and Security
Policy) envisaging an EU military force.
Medidas estratégicas urgentes:
As for immediate needs, Poland should improveand launcher. Its two batteries cost $132 million in total. Incremental missiles were recently reported to cost somewhat over $2 million each. (...) Poland should contract with NATO-member militaries or civilian firms to develop cyber capabilities and train Polish cyber troops, complementing measures already underway. Poland should develop an information warfare capability using social media and other channels, to counter Russia’s active propaganda campaign, which uses overt methods and its numerous “trolls.” (...) Poland should seek to accelerate licensed production of the 1,000 Spike ATGMs, ordered from PGZ’s Mesko plant for delivery in 2017-20. Some of its 670 Rosomak wheeled Infantry Fighting Vehicles can transport Spike-equipped troops (and 307 more Rosomaks are on order). If needed, Poland should order rival ATGM systems for faster delivery. (...) Poland should immediately order an adequate number of the new Polish Piorun missiles, to supplement the approximately 2,000 Polish Grom missiles currently held (400 launchers, with only 5 missiles per launcher). (...) A network of all-weather shelters should be constructed, with stores of food, fuel, weapons and ammunition, medical kit, and communications gear.
the overall command and control of its forces,
plus undertake a number of urgent acquisitionsto bolster strategic deterrence and tactical preparations. (...) Poland should undertake these urgent procurements using radically different methods to overcome the systemic delays in the past. (...) Poland should ensure that all battlefield radios are digital and encrypted. Indeed, it should ensure that all Ministry and Armed Forces communications are secure, as many doubts on this matter persist. (...) Poland has been contemplating the Extended Range (900 km) JASSM cruise missile. If it places an order, it will be the first US ally to operate the Extended Range variant. Poland should expedite this procurement, mobilizing the support required in the US Congress. (...) Poland should address its capacity for independent targeting of key weapons, JASSM missiles, and others. (...) Poland should plan and train for the dispersal of the F-16s and weaponry to temporary, random airfields and roads in Poland itself, in the Baltics, and Romania. (...)
The Naval Strike Missile (NSM) coastal missiles
launched from two batteries of onshore mobile
launchers serve primarily to interdict surface
shipping, but can also have a strategic dimension.
With a 185 km range, if properly targeted they can
also destroy onshore targets, say in Kaliningrad.Poland should rapidly augment its targeting radars for longer distances. It should also order more of these NSM missiles
Plan de movilización:
Poland should plan mobilization (including transport to northeastern Poland, the Baltics, and Romania) for both its Regular and Reserve units. Mobilization domestically of the new Territorials should also be on the agenda. (...) Poland should demonstrate readiness by frequent exercises. Interchangeable and mutually redundant channels should be planned. Railways, aircraft from the national carrier LOT and other sources, civilian road vehicles, and Polish and non-Polish ferries should all be included, in addition to the military’s own resources. (...) Transport for the Territorials should include use of local civilian 4WD and other vehicles. Mobilization and transfers east from the center and west of the country should be planned and publicly rehearsed. (...) Radical change is needed to the archaic culture regarding MRO, which calls for most of it to be done by Poland’s military. Civilian contractors should be brought in to replace over-stretched or badly run military servicing units.